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G E R A L D J . G A L G A N 
The Changing of the Gods1 
At the dawn of philosophy, Thales marveled or, perhaps, 
despaired: "All things are full of gods."Today, we are living through 
the final phase of the centuries-long "changing of the gods": 
technology has superseded philosophy; men are playing gods in place 
of gods acting as men. My remarks will fall into three areas: first, 
ancient philosophy, that is, the bearing of the pagan gods on the birth 
of philosophy; second, the development of modern philosophy out of 
medieval theological categories, that is, the bearing of the Christian 
God on the birth of modern science; third, by way of conclusion, our 
contemporary situation, that is, our "problematic" status as "gods 
without God." 
The Ancient Gods and the Birth of Philosophy 
Ancient philosophy began with myth, never entirely losing sight 
of nor completely negating this pre-philosophical mode. Stripping 
the events occurring in the world of their "becoming" and relocating 
them in a supra-temporal framework of universal paradigms and not 
singular facts, myth proposes a petrified and sacred "past" which can 
be reenacted by virtue of the "secret" knowledge of paradigmatic 
events which is imparted to the human race by the race of the gods. 
The sacred — which suspends rectilinear time in its ordinariness and 
profaneness — exists as a space determined by self-contained being 
which is at rest, over against the profane as a degradation of being, 
determined by a becoming which is outside of itself. The form of man 
which is mortal in the human race is deathless in the race of gods, thus 
paradoxically assuring the separateness of the two races: the gods 
proceed from "on high," but they are in function of sacred places and 
are not all-powerful within nature. 
Here we have the germ of Aristotle's philosophical notion of the 
"primary differentiation of place" in terms of the "above and the 
* This paper was first delivered as part of a Symposium at Sacred Heart 
University on "The Catholic Tradition: The Rocky Road to Modernity," 
held on March 25, 1988. 
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below" — the imperfection of change residing in the lower precincts 
of the cosmos, in its terrestrial center.1 Here also is the seed of the 
bifurcation in the Ptolemaic astronomy of the uppermost, heavenly, 
bright points of light and the lowermost, non-luminous sphere of 
mud and rock which is the earth. The unity of the cosmos is spatially 
articulated and circumscribed, cosmic order manifesting itself in a 
series of planes, and its unity filtering downward, with a concomitant 
loss of perfection, to the particular things governed by profane, 
rectilinear or directional time on earth. Circular motion, epitomized 
in the stars, is a tribute paid to the perfection of rest, and the 
outermost sphere of the cosmos, wherein is found "the seat of all that 
is divine," is a revolving of that which is itself actually at rest.2 
This closed, finished, eternal cosmos, a kind of "steady-state" 
universe, is the sum-total of being — what Parmenides called the 
"all-limited."3 The epistemological primacy is given to what is 
known, never to the knower, and although there is nothing above 
reason there are particular things beneath the dignity of reason, such 
as hair, bones, and clumps of earth. Against the irreducible, irrational 
power of fate, which is untouched by reason although it possesses no 
power over reason, not even the wills of the gods can prevail, and even 
they must struggle and suffer. The gods, after all, represent neither 
infinity nor omnipotence, and since the infinite can never be an actual 
thing,4 there can be no infinite aspirations for culture, no pro-
grammatic attempt to conquer contingent matter. 
The nature of man is to bespeak the finite essences of nature: to 
be anything less is to be a beast, to be anything more is to be a god. To 
construe man as "the measure of all things" is to negate the very 
possibility of philosophy as a properly human activity with a more-
than-human purpose. As that which is imitated, nature is the 
repository of intelligibility, the home of form, and no mere code of 
other-than-natural meanings to be deciphered. Not even the race of 
gods can interfere from outside with the course of nature, and this 
holds as truly at the mythic beginning as at the philosophical twilight 
of ancient culture; for although the world becomes for Stoicism a 
Cosmopolis, it is a city inhabited in common by two races, gods and 
men, which are separated but which require each other's existence.5 
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The Christian God and the Birth of Modern Science 
The God whose viewpoint is exhibited in Christian faith shows 
himself to himself: trinity of persons is the same as one-ness of 
essence, so that God as Father generates the Divine Son and shares 
the same nature with his absolutely singular Word. As Creator, 
however, he wills a multiplicity of words, a world-book which is not 
of "one substance" with its speaker; what is created is completely 
other than God, and there is nothing divine about the world. To think 
Creation ex nihilo, some kind of paradigm is needed where there is 
complete dependence of the effect on the cause, and complete 
independence of the cause in relation to the effect — a virtually 
context-less causality where cause and effect are entirely different 
orders of being. Thus God is beyond all substance for Anselm,6 not in 
any genus for Aquinas,7 and is an actual singular for Duns Scotus.8 
Whereas pagan divinity must be with things that are not divine, God, 
for Christian belief, would exist in undiminished plenitude even had 
there been no world created; this is the God who is not merely 
separated from non-divine things in the world but is completely other 
than the world itself. 
The bridging of the infinite distance between God and man, 
which maintains the difference between Creator and creature, is the 
life of Christ, which is a mixture of everyday, profane becoming and 
the most sublime tragedy, and which overcomes the ancient 
dichotomy of the sacred and the profane. Humanity can now assume 
a significance completely apart from any relation to a supra-human 
race of gods. Instead of the Stoic notion of the world as a city 
occupied by two races, gods and men, what is called for is two 
radically different cities, one supranaturally, and the other naturally, 
founded. The city of God and the city of man thus come to occupy the 
place once held by the race of gods and the race of men, and 
philosophy can now be informed by the conviction that created being 
has a direction, nay, is a temporal direction, and that its Creator is 
capable of becoming a creature without losing his uncreated Being. 
The world can now be seen to have not only a contingency of 
"existence," in the sense that God need not have made a world at all, 
but also a contingency of "nature," in the sense that God need not 
have made the particular world which he made. The Creator-God 
comes to be thought of as freely binding himself by Covenant to 
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uphold the particular world he has willed to create, so that a very 
un-Greek emphasis can now be put on the inherent singularity of the 
world, transformed from a realm that is full of gods to a realm of 
imposed lawfulness — no mere spatial totality, but rather the relation 
between states of a spatial whole at different times. This unfinished, 
created universe, the unity of which is not yet fully experienced, 
having been likened to a book, can now be metaphorized 
as a machine, and with this we have the emergence of modern science 
which assumes that matter can have a real being apart from form and 
that the universe is a realm of laws of matter in motion. Devoid of 
absolutely privileged upward and downward places, the universe first 
proposed by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo is non-hierarchical, 
with a homogeneity of material and process throughout — a universe 
where creative activity, both God and man's, is focused on the 
particular thing as its terminus ad quern. 
The lowliest life, even for a sceptic like Montaigne, houses the 
whole of things human,9 rooted as that particular life is, not in 
privileged space, but in the maintenance of unity in opposition 
through time. And this is possible because.the very hairs on one's 
head are numbered by God,10 or,, as Leibniz says, because 
"individuality involves infinity."11 When the logic of an incarnated 
infinite measure is taken out of a purely theological framework and 
applied to physical science, the race can be designated, as Descartes 
suggests, as the "masters and possessors of nature."12 Man is now 
seen to transcend'nature, by virtue of his having "a man's measure, 
that is, an angel's,"13 and human cognition now comes to be 
conceived in the way that medieval theology conceived angelic 
cognition. Yet, by virtue of his "extended" or "material" being, man 
remains subject to the "laws" of nature. There thus emerges the 
modern dualism of mind and matter, of the inside and outside of 
consciousness, which supersedes the ancient mythic and philosophical 
dualism of the upward and the downward in cosmic space. This 
supersession is made possible by the medieval theological valorization 
of rectilinear temporality in which the temporal "after"can be seen to 
be a "making outward" of the intelligibility that was "inward" in the 
temporal "before." 
The assumption is now that nature, as a code of other-than-
natural meanings to be deciphered, has to be modified by the 
investigator in order to be genuinely known, so that physical things 
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themselves are thought to come under the influence of the human 
individual and no longer to operate as they would without that 
individual. What can be realized by the individual's own power is now 
central, that is, a selfhood which, as first presented by Rousseau, is 
not experienced except through itself.14 This further suggests a notion 
of theory which no longer relates to the resting place of a 
contemplative onlooker but to the work-place of the human subject's 
exertion and production. Human subjectivity can now be seen to 
modify the sheer externality of space and time, and what is now at 
issue is not the love of wisdom, not the speech of philo-sophia, but the 
"logos" given to "technique," that is, technology. The dis-
placement of the primacy of philosophy by the primacy of technology 
is rooted in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment's proclamation of 
limitless possibilities for the perfectibility of a human individuality 
which is seen to be the locus of the intelligibility of nature itself. 
Thus the human race, in the late modern world, comes to be 
conceived as a mortal race of gods, the creator of its own tactics of 
living,15 in sharp contrast to the ancient world where the race of 
immortal gods both hides from and discloses to men the means of life. 
Man as creator makes sense in terms of a co-creatorship with God, as 
Augustine himself suggested when he said that men "could be masters 
of this world if they were willing to be the sons of God."16 In this way, 
even when modern thought "conceives itself as in the sharpest 
possible contradiction to its theological prehistory," as Hans 
Blumenberg remarks in his recent study of modern philosophy, "it is 
bound to the frame of reference of what it renounces."17 There is a 
sense in which late modern culture, as Heidegger puts it, remains 
"Christian even when it loses its [Christian] faith."18 
Gods Without God 
The problematic aspect of the changing of the gods may not lie, 
then, in any purported inconsistency of modernity with Christianity. 
It may, instead, lie in the attempt of late cultural modernity to remove 
all Greek or Hellenic elements from itself. In this way, the essentially 
problematic aspect of the completion of the changing of the gods may 
lie in the essential powerlessness of late modern thought to know its 
own essence as modern and the ground of that essence. The decline of 
speculative philosophy, more particularly the decline of an integral 
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sense of the contemplative, as the most significant element of our 
Hellenic heritage, may be the most significant loss confronting us in 
the midst of all that we have gained in modernity. The problem with 
the changing of the gods, the loss involved in modernity, may very 
well be the loss of the will to understand the more-than-modern 
conditions of modernity. 
The sign of this loss may be the contemporary epistemological 
tendency to construe knowledge as that which is only instrumental 
for further knowledge. It is exclusively within the edifice of 
knowledge as praxis that the sign is to perform its signifying function, 
and the differing vantage points of interpretation are no longer held 
to look out upon a world which is common to all perspectives. 
There are, in other words, for the young and compassionate 
human gods, as many "c i t ies" as there are interpretive 
vantage points, and these cities do not communicate. In this way, 
deprived of an intellectual center with which to unify a constantly 
increasing body of data, we find, as Cassirer has suggested, that our 
interpretive efforts tend to hide an understanding of the meaning of 
human being more than they disclose it.I9 What is at issue is no longer 
the contemplative "imperial intellect "as Cardinal Newman called it, 
but rather the productive "autocratic ego" constituted by endless 
consumption of disposable things in a "time scarce" society. Even 
knowledge has come to be construed as disposable and as a 
commodity — the knowledge industry, the movement of information, 
the processing of words. 
Given this view, Theoria, with its claim to truth, is effectively 
reduced to a species of technology. Truth is now to be understood as a 
system of procedures for the production, operation, and circulation 
of propositions which are purely instrumental. Trapped in an 
epistemic circle where signs can only promote the comprehension of 
further signs, and where the whole circle is reducible no longer merely 
to the early modern, Baconian assertion that "knowledge is power," 
but to the late modern contention that "power is knowledge," 
the will to search for the ground of being is in danger of being entirely 
lost. 
The contemporary human race of gods, I submit, is without an 
awareness of the importance of the search for the ground, without an 
awareness of the primacy of foundational discourse, to the extent 
that it has lost sight of the contemplative element in that conjunction 
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of the productive and the contemplative that western Christianity 
proposed. "But you will have gathered," Nietzsche admitted, "what I 
am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which 
our faith in science rests — that even we seekers after knowledge 
today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the 
flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith 
which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is 
divine.''720 
The conjunction of ancient philosophy and Christian faith here, 
for all their differences, is highly significant. Each provided a 
metaphysics, each addressed a divine or more-than-human end for 
philosophy as a human activity. And if men who have changed into 
gods are to examine their essence, its limits, and its ground, then the 
conjunction and the differences will have to be drawn into the forum 
of speculative philosophy, emergent once again after its eclipse in the 
shadow of new gods. 
Is it not written in your law, "I said, you are gods?"21 
And yet "the Lord your God is God of gods and 
Lord of lords . . . ."^ 
The truly problematic aspect of the changing of the gods is the 
failure to think through the implications of "modern philosophy's 
developmental incorporation of originally theological categories"23 
— the late modern forgetfulness of the ground, of the sense in which 
truth is divine. The new gods pursue truth but only as if it were 
functional, instrumental, not as having its matrix in the God of their 
own godhood.24 "The only truths that are useful are instruments to be 
thrown away," Brother William says, near the close of Umberto Eco's 
The Name of the Rose.25 Without a more-than-instrumental con-
ception of truth, the new gods are without God, without the "God of 
glory,"26 of whom our medieval tradition spoke. 
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